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Abstract.	 The	 thesis	 put	 forward	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 that	 in	 social	 life	 in	 general,	 and	 in	 the	 economic	 sphere	 in	
particular,	 the	 relationships	between	 formal	norms	and	 informal	 social	norms	can	be	 interpreted	 in	 terms	of	either	
reciprocal	 complementarity	 or	 conflict.	 The	 concept	 of	 complementarity	 illustrates	 how	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 norm	
cooperate	 with	 and	 reinforce	 each	 other,	 and	 describes	 under	 what	 circumstances	 formal	 norms	 can	 or	 cannot	
replace	informal	rules.	Conversely,	the	notion	of	conflict	between	different	kinds	of	norms	distinguishes	two	forms	of	
antagonism:	 prohibition	 (which	 occurs	 when	 one	 type	 of	 norm	 prohibits	 enforcement	 of	 the	 other),	 and	 mutual	
exclusiveness	(which	occurs	when	one	type	of	norm	crowds	out	the	other,	without	this	entailing	prohibition).	
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1.	Introduction	
	
Informal	 social	 norms	 are	 pervasive	 components	 of	 social	 life	which	 contribute	 together	with	 formal	
rules	 to	 the	 shaping	of	human	 relationships.	As	a	 consequence,	an	analysis	of	 the	 relationships	between	
these	 two	 types	 of	 norm	 is	 fundamental	 for	 any	 understanding	 of	 how	 social	 systems	 function.	 It	 is	
probably	for	this	reason	that	such	relationships	are	investigated	in	many	disciplines.	Douglass	North,	whose	
approach	 has	 influenced	 numerous	 studies	 in	 economics	 and	 political	 science,	 showed	 that	 they	 are	
essential	 for	 understanding	 institutional	 change;	 the	 Austrian	 School	 examined	 them	 to	 explain	
spontaneous	orders.	Legal	scholars	–	especially	in	the	1990s	–	have	pointed	out	that	patterns	of	behaviour	
can	 be	 induced	 by	 altering	 not	 only	 the	 law	but	 also	 customs	 and	 habits;	 experimental	 and	 behavioural	
economics,	 as	 well	 as	 economic	 psychology,	 have	 shown	 how	 social	 norms	 based	 on	 fairness	 and	
reciprocity	 cooperate	 with	 the	 market’s	 formal	 norms	 to	 determine	 the	 outcome	 of	 individual	
performances.	Although	these	approaches	shed	light	on	many	aspects	of	formal	and	social	norms,	none	of	
them	has	provided	a	comprehensive	theory.	
This	 paper	 starts	 from	 this	 fragmentation,	 and	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 a	 satisfactory	 theory	 about	 the	
relationships	between	formal	and	informal	norms	is	still	lacking.	It	tries	to	fill	this	gap	by	proposing	a	new	
perspective	 on	 these	phenomena,	 and	by	 suggesting	 a	 unified	 framework	 in	which	 to	 arrange	 the	many	
recommendations	and	intuitions	deriving	from	other	approaches.	In	particular,	it	examines	two	dimensions	
of	the	interrelations	between	formal	and	informal	social	norms:	one,	more	general	in	character,	considers	
how	 social	 and	 legal	 norms	 interact	 in	 various	 circumstances	 of	 private	 and	 public	 life;	 the	 other,	more	
specific,	examines	how	the	relationships	between	formal	and	informal	norms	take	shape	in	the	economic	
sphere.	
By	 ‘informal	 social	 norms’	 (or	more	briefly	 social	 norms)	 I	mean	 rules	 that	 are	 not	 promulgated	by	 a	
legal	authority	and	which	regularly	influence	behaviours.	They	are	based	on	socially	shared	beliefs	(such	as	
customs,	 traditions,	 and	 codes	 of	 behaviour)	 about	what	 people	 ought	 to	 do,	 and	 they	 involve	 social	 or	
moral	sanctions	(see,	R.	Posner,	1997,	p.	365;	Fehr	and	Gächter,	2000,	p.	166;	Dequech,	2009,	p.	72).	Social	
norms	are	informal,	since	they	are	enforced	“by	the	approval	or	disapproval	of	other	people	in	the	group	or	
community”,	while	legal	norms	(that	is	a	significant	class	of	formal	norms)	are	“ultimately	enforced	by	the	
organizations	 of	 the	 legal	 system”	 (Dequech,	 2009,	 p.	 72).	 This	 implies	 that	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 norms	 are	
describable	as	non-legal	 (i.e.	not	expressed	 in	 law)	and	 legal	norms,	 respectively	 (Hodgson,	2006,	pp.	11	
and	13).	
In	 short,	 social	 norms	 are	 informal	 and	 are	 not	made	 explicit	 by	written	 law	 (therefore,	 they	 can	 be	
labelled	‘informal	social	norms’),	while	legal	norms	are	formal	and	are	expressed	by	law.	For	these	reasons,	
and	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 brevity,	 in	 what	 follows	 the	 pairs	 of	 terms	 ‘legal	 norms/social	 norms’	 and	 ‘formal	
norms/informal	norms’	will	be	generally	–	but	not	always	–	used	 interchangeably.	However,	 it	 should	be	
pointed	out	 that	 the	concept	of	 ‘formal’	 is	broader	 than	 that	of	 ‘legal’.	As	 its	 stem	reveals,	 the	adjective	
‘formal’	 indicates	something	which	has	a	defined	shape;	and	when	 it	refers	to	norms,	 it	evokes	a	general	
class	 –	 one	 that	 is	 not	 simply	 reducible	 to	 law	 –	 which	 exhibits	 this	 connotation.	 Some	 norms	 of	
organizations,	 such	 as	 firms,	 administrative	 systems,	 bureaucracies	 etc.,	 have	 formal,	 definite,	 features	
(such	as	directives	which	convey	commands	or	procedures)	but	are	not	legal	prescriptions.	By	contrast,	the	
term	 ‘informal’	means:	 “Not	done	or	made	according	 to	 a	 regular	or	prescribed	 form”	 (Onions,	 1973,	 p.	
1069).	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 opposition	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	 norms	 can	 be	 interpreted	 in	
terms	of	a	distinction	between	rules	whose	boundaries	are	well	delineated	and	norms	whose	boundaries	
are	not.	Used	in	this	sense,	the	expression	‘formal	norm’	will	be	adopted	instead	of	‘legal	norm’	when	this	
latter	expression	–	because	of	its	too	specific	meaning	–	is	inadequate	to	capture	certain	phenomena.1	
Formal-legal	and	informal	norms	can	be	conceived	as	alternative	rules	which	govern	social	 interaction,	
in	that	they	work	as	different	mechanisms	of	social	coordination.	Given	this	premise,	the	thesis	put	forward	
here	 is	 that	 the	 relationships	 between	 legal	 and	 social	 norms	 can	 be	 interpreted	 in	 terms	 of	 either	
reciprocal	complementarity	or	conflict,	and	that	 in	 the	economic	sphere	relations	between	formal	norms	
(like	those	which	regulate	exchanges	and	contracts,	whose	enforcement	 is	ultimately	guaranteed	by	legal	
institutions)	and	informal	social	norms	can	be	evaluated	by	adopting	the	same	scheme.	
By	‘relationships	of	complementarity’	I	mean	situations	in	which	formal	and	informal	norms	cooperate	
with	 and	 even	 reinforce	 each	 other:	 for	 example,	 when	 a	 legal	 and	 a	 social	 norm	 jointly	 contribute	 	 to	
suggesting	 or	 preventing	 a	 certain	 behaviour.	 Cooperation	within	 the	 same	 behavioural	 area	 sometimes	
indicates	the	fact	that	one	norm	might	incorporate	one	of	the	functions	of	the	other.	In	this	case,	the	legal	
norm	 progressively	 formalises	 issues	 originally	 suggested	 only	 by	 the	 social	 norm,	 replacing	 one	 of	 its	
particular	 functions.2	 Yet	 replacement	 or,	we	may	 say,	 ‘erosion’	 is	 not	 always	 possible,	 as	 in	 the	 case	of	
shared	moral	 judgements	 which	 cooperate	 with	 law	 but	 cannot	 be	 eradicated	 by	 it.	 This	 situation	 also	
characterises	social	conventions	(such	as	norms	of	kindness,	politeness,	appropriateness	of	behaviour	etc.),	
which	are	complied	with	because	other	people	 follow	them,	although	they	are	 to	some	extent	arbitrary.	
Their	 function	 is	 to	support	the	social	order,	and	they	are	not	replaceable	with	 legal	norms.	 In	short,	 the	
replaceability	or	non-replaceability	of	one	norm	with	another	is	the	criterion	used	to	distinguish	two	types	
of	complementarity,	which	I	call	C1	and	C2.	
With	 the	 expression	 ‘relationships	 of	 conflict’	 I	 refer	 to	 circumstances	 in	 which	 formal	 and	 informal	
norms	are	not	 compatible:	 that	 is,	 situations	 in	which	adoption	of	one	 type	of	 rule	 impedes	compliance	
with	 the	 other.	 In	 some	 cases,	 the	 conflict	 is	 radical,	 and	 one	 kind	 of	 rule	 explicitly	 prohibits	 the	
enforcement	of	the	other,	as	when	the	law	bans	codes	of	revenge	or	seeks	to	suppress	illegal	markets.	Yet	
the	 relationship	 of	 conflict	 also	 exhibits	 a	 less	 radical	 dimension,	 which	 entails	 that	 one	 kind	 of	 norm	
crowds	out	 the	other:	paying	 the	parents	of	your	girlfriend	when	 they	have	 invited	you	 for	dinner	 is	not	
prohibited;	nonetheless,	the	norm	regulating	formal	economic	exchange	-	based	on	monetary	payment	-	is	
incompatible	 with	 the	 social	 norm.	 In	 this	 circumstance,	 the	 mutual	 exclusiveness	 of	 norms	 can	 be	
described	in	terms	of	‘either	this	type	of	norm	or	the	other’,	but	it	does	not	involve	prohibition.	Therefore,	
‘prohibition’	and	‘mutual	exclusiveness’	constitute	the	criteria	by	which	relations	of	conflict	are	evaluated.	
																																								 																				
1 By recombining the two pairs of concepts (formal/informal norms and legal/non-legal norms), it can be argued that 
formal/non-legal norms govern diverse organizations. But this topic is not dealt with in this essay. 
2 For example, both the highway code and social norms cooperate when they suggest driving safely, and prescribe the 
same prudent behaviour: the use of seatbelts. But until the 1970s in many countries such behaviour was regulated only 
by a social norm, and only later became a legal prescription. 
The	 notions	 of	 complementarity	 and	 conflict	 occasionally	 appear	 in	 the	 current	 literature,	 and	 only	
rarely	are	their	various	meanings	analysed	systematically.	I	employ	these	terms	because:	
i) starting from observable phenomena, they clarify that the relationships between 
formal and informal norms may fundamentally be viewed as opposing terms. The 
notion of complementarity shows that formal and informal norms work in the same 
direction, because they reinforce each other (and such reinforcement may culminate 
in the legal formalization of a social norm); while the notion of conflict emphasises 
that the two kinds of norm, being antagonistic, work in opposite directions; 
ii) they create a common ground able to connect different approaches, which range from 
economics to legal studies and from sociology to economic psychology. 
These	approaches,	implicitly	or	logically,	involve	complementarity	and	conflict,	but	they	do	not	provide	
any	 theories	 based	 on	 those	 concepts.	 In	 other	 words,	 by	 using	 the	 notions	 of	 complementarity	 and	
conflict	this	paper	intends:1)	to	provide	a	new	view	on	the	relationships	between	formal	and	social	norms;	
2)	to	show	the	connections	between	some	of	the	results	of	the	approaches	taken	by	different	disciplines,	
even	when	 these	do	not	directly	 refer	 to	 the	notions	under	discussion;	3)	 to	 furnish	a	unitary	and	more	
general	 framework	 able	 to	 fill	 the	 gaps	 in	 other	 interpretations	 which	 consider	 only	 partial	 –	 though	
important	–	dimensions	of	the	problem.	Consequently,	clarification	of	the	relevance	of	the	two	criteria	(the	
two	 subsets	 of	 complementarity	 and	 conflict)	 is	 the	 theoretical	 step	 that	 precedes	 the	 ensuing	
classification.	 Finally,	 the	 view	 of	 social	 and	 formal	 norms	 (and	 of	 their	 relationships)	 proposed	 in	what	
follows	implies	a	conception	according	to	which	the	individual	is	socially	embedded	in	these	norms	as	well	
as	 being	 institutionalised	 and	 governed	 by	 them.	 This	 entails	 that	 individuals	 and	 socio-institutional	
structures	influence	each	other.	The	notions	of	complementarity	and	conflict	emphasise	these	aspects	and	
show	 that	 behaviours,	 although	 engendered	 by	 individuals,	 also	 depend	 on	 how	 norms	 relate	 to	 each	
other.	A	behaviour	inspired	by	a	social	norm,	for	example,	is	explained	not	only	with	reference	to	this	kind	
of	norm,	but	also	with	 reference	 to	 the	attitude	 that	 it	expresses	 towards	a	 formal	norm	 (depending	on	
whether	 it	 is	 considered	 as	 the	 complement	 or	 antagonist	 of	 the	 social	 norm).	 Some	 approaches	which	
illustrate	the	relationships	between	norms	do	not	always	adopt	this	perspective;	and	they	sometimes	refer	
to	 variants	 of	 methodological	 individualism.	 The	 idea	 put	 forward	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 that	 some	 of	 these	
analytical	outcomes	can	be	reformulated	in	light	of	the	above-outlined	framework.	
	The	paper	is	organized	as	follows:	Section	2	introduces	the	literature	which	has	dealt	with	relationships	
between	formal	and	informal	norms	and	has	drawn	up	classifications	by	explicitly	or	implicitly	considering	
the	notions	of	complementarity	and	conflict;	Section	3	examines	how	the	relationships	of	complementarity	
and	conflict	can	be	reformulated,	and	focuses	on	legal	and	social	norms.	In	particular,	subsections	3.1	and	
3.2	analyse	complementarities	of	type	C1	and	C2;	while	subsection	3.3	considers	relationships	of	conflict	in	
terms	of	both	prohibition	and	mutual	exclusiveness.	Subsection	3.4	maintains	that	the	boundaries	between	
the	two	kinds	of	norm	are	mobile.	Section	4	presents	the	analysis	of	formal	rules	and	informal	social	norms	
in	 the	 economic	 domain,	 and	 subsections	 4.1	 and	 4.2,	 respectively,	 discuss	 how	 complementarity	 and	
conflict	emerge	within	this	sphere.	Finally,	Section	5	draws	conclusions.	
	
	
2. Complementarity and conflict: perspectives and classifications. 
	
In	 recent	 times,	 two	authors	have	 strongly	oriented	 the	debate	on	norms:	 F.A.	Hayek	and	D.C.	North	
(Chavance	2008,	p.	59).	Although	Hayek	does	not	use	the	terms	‘formal’	and	‘informal	norms’,	they	play	a	
role	 in	 his	 evolutionary	 theory.	 In	 his	 approach,	 primitive	 communities	were	 initially	 regulated	 by	 social	
norms,	traditions,	customs,	habits	etc.,	and	only	later	adopted	a	legal	structure	which	replaced	the	original	
informal	norms	in	some	domains.	The	competition	between	different	group	rules	determined	the	adoption	
of	more	 advantageous	 norms,	 and	 led	 to	 the	 consequent	 decline	 of	 less	 advantageous	 alternative	 rules.	
This	process	 coincides	with	 the	 formation	of	 spontaneous	orders	as	a	 selection	of	abstract	 rules:	 that	 is,	
purpose-independent	rules	which	apply	to	an	indefinite	number	of	instances.	Law	also	takes	shape	through	
evolution	as	 the	articulation	and	systematisation	of	previously	existing	practices	and	norms	(Hayek,	1973	
pp.	85	and	100).	 If	 no	external	 intervention	modifies	 this	process,	 law	preserves	abstract	 rules	based	on	
traditions	 without	 imposing	 any	 particular	 order	 (Hayek,	 1960,	 chap.	 10),	 and	 implements	 spontaneous	
order,	also	by	removing	certain	 impasses	that	spontaneous	order	 is	not	able	to	overcome	with	 its	own	
force	 (Hayek	 1973,	 p.	 88).	 This	 perspective	 entails	 that	 formal-legal	 rules	 are	 beneficial	 only	 if	 they	 are	
coherent	with	underlying	informal	norms	and	practices,	and	that	the	process	of	formation	of	spontaneous	
order	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 fundamental	 continuity	 between	 formal	 and	 social	 norms.	 When	 society	 is	
fallaciously	conceived	as	an	“organization”	 that	must	be	 rationally	planned,	 formal	 rules	–	which	assume	
the	 form	 of	 “commands”	 rather	 than	 abstract	 general	 rules	 –	 become	 separated	 from	 customs	 and	
traditions.	This	destroys	spontaneous	order	as	the	experience	of	socialism,	according	to	Hayek,	has	shown	
(Hayek,	1973;	1978).	
Although	it	is	not	central	to	his	analysis,	Hayek	offers	an	interpretation	of	relationships	between	formal	
and	 informal	norms.	This	theory,	according	to	which	 law	represents	the	evolution	of	certain	social	norms	
(Hayek,	1973,	p.	78),	conveys	the	idea	that	social	norms	can	be	replaced	by	formal	norms	as	a	consequence	
of	 a	 certain	 complementarity	 (see	 sub-section	 3.1).	 However,	 Hayek	 clarifies	 neither	 what	 condition	
enables	formal	norms	to	replace	social	rules	nor	why	some	social	norms	are	eroded,	while	others	are	not,	
but	 rather	 persist	 and	 reinforce	 formal	 norms.	 Essentially,	 these	 questions	 remain	 unanswered	 because	
Hayek	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 clear	 definition	 of	 informal	 norms.	 In	 spontaneous	 order,	 law	 is	 seen	 as	 an	
extension	of	customs	 (Hodgson,	2009),	and	this	prevents	Hayek	 from	distinguishing	between	 the	specific	
‘ways	of	working’	of	the	two	systems	of	norms	as	structures	of	social	coordination.	Ultimately,	however,	he	
does	not	examine	the	various	forms	of	conflict	between	formal	and	social	norms,	except	those	in	some	way	
related	to	 the	notion	of	constructivism,	which	 implies	 that	 law	does	not	work	 in	continuity	with	customs	
and	with	social	rules	that	have	emerged	spontaneously	over	time.	This	particular	idea	of	conflict	does	not	
consider	 the	 fact	 that	 law	often	 tries	 to	 repress	 certain	 customs,	even	when	no	constructivist	 force	 is	 at	
work.	 Law	and	customs	can	be	 the	outcomes	of	 the	 same	spontaneous	processes	and	nonetheless	be	 in	
opposition	because	they	prescribe	alternative	behaviours	(see	sub-sections	3.3,	3.4	and	4.2).	
Formal	constraints	(e.g.,	regulations,	 laws,	statutes,	constitutions)	and	informal	constraints	(e.g.,	social	
norms,	 conventions,	 self-imposed	 codes	 of	 conduct)	 play	 a	 fundamental	 role	 in	 Douglass	 North’s	 new	
institutionalism,	an	approach	which	has	influenced	economics,	sociology	and	political	science.	According	to	
North,	 formal	 and	 informal	 constraints	 are	 the	 two	 components	 of	 institutions,	 and	 the	 varying	ways	 in	
which	 they	 interact	 determine	 how	 societies	 change	 over	 time.	 From	 a	 historical	 perspective,	 informal	
constraints	precede	and	condition	the	subsequent	development	of	formal	constraints.	Their	difference	“is	
one	of	 degree”,	 and	 this	 implies	 a	 continuous	 and	 “unidirectional”	move	 “from	unwritten	 traditions	 and	
customs	to	written	laws”	(North	1990,	p.	46).	The	transition	from	customs	to	laws	delineates	the	idea	that	
formal	norms	replace	informal	norms	over	time,	but	this	concept,	as	in	the	case	of	Hayek,	is	not	developed,	
and	North	does	not	explain	why	certain	 informal	norms	are	replaced,	while	others	persist	and	cooperate	
with	their	formal	counterparts.	However,	North	alludes	to	complementarity	when	he	argues	that	“Formal	
rules	can	complement	and	increase	the	effectiveness	of	informal	constraints”	(1990,	pp.	46).	This	happens	
both	when	 an	 institutional	 system	 invests	 in	 “piracy”	 and	 when	 it	 supports	 productive	 activities	 (North	
1990,	pp.	77-78).	However,	complementarity,	although	expressed	in	this	form,	is	not	theoretically	analysed	
nor	is	it	included	in	a	general	theory.		
The	notion	of	 conflict	between	different	 kinds	of	norms	 is	not	dealt	with,	 except	 in	 a	particular	 case.	
Social	norms,	and	 in	general	“cultural	heritage”,	change	slowly,	and	this	 is	 the	origin	of	 institutional	path	
dependence.	“[I]nformal	constraints	change	at	a	different	rate	than	formal	rules”	(North	1990,	87),	and	this	
can	engender	a	conflict	between	the	two	kinds	of	norm,	since	reforms	and	revolutions	can	rapidly	change	
formal	 institutions,	while	customs	evolve	gradually.	A	discontinuity	of	this	type	characterises	situations	 in	
which	formal	rules	that	have	developed	in	one	country	are	imposed	on	another	community,	thus	triggering	
tension	with	its	informal	norms	(North	1990,	pp.	101-103).	Also	in	this	case,	as	in	that	of	complementarity,	
North	 does	 not	 provide	 a	 conceptual	 definition	 of	 conflict.	 This	 notion,	 rather	 than	 being	 defined	 in	
theoretical	 terms,	 is	 described	 in	 relation	 to	 cases	 that	 show	 the	 heterogeneity	 between	 formal	 and	
informal	norms	due	to	inappropriate	institutional	designs.	
Some	scholars	have	proposed	typologies	of	relationships	between	formal	and	informal	norms.	In	many	
respects,	 their	 intent	 is	 more	 descriptive	 than	 analytical,	 since	 for	 the	 most	 part	 they	 do	 not	 discuss	
theoretical	 criteria	 which	 explain	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 norms,	 and	 they	 usually	
present	only	schemes	in	which	to	include	empirical	cases.	Nee	(1998,	p.	85)	recognises	the	need	to	have	“a	
theory	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 relationships	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	 constraints”	 that	 might	 explain	
variations	 in	 institutional	 performance,	 and	 he	maintains	 that	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 norm	 can	 be	 congruent	
(when	 they	 reciprocally	 reinforce	 each	 other,	 and	 for	 this	 reason	 are	 closely	 coupled),	decoupled	 (when	
informal	norms	become	 separated	 from	 formal	 rules	which	have	 ceremonial	 characteristics),	 or	opposed	
(when	 individuals	 organise	 economic	 activities,	 as	 has	 occurred	 in	 socialist	 	 systems,	where	 people	 have	
organised	a	parallel,	illegal,	“second	economy”).	But	Nee	does	not	discuss	in	detail	the	criteria	on	which	his	
classification	 is	 built.	 Therefore,	 although	 his	 typology	 describes	 relevant	 cases,	 it	 does	 not	 provide	
sufficient	 suggestions	about	 the	 logic	determining	 the	 relationships	between	 formal	and	 informal	norms.	
The	 concepts	 of	 “close	 coupling”	 and	 “oppositions	 norms”	 could	 be	 developed	 to	 investigate	 the	 basic	
relationships	 between	 kinds	 of	 norms;	 but	 the	 former	 is	 not	 analytically	 dealt	 with,	 and	 the	 latter	 is	
confined	 to	 cases	 in	 which	 “institutions	 and	 organizational	 sanctions	 are	 weak	 relative	 to	 contradicting	
group	 interests”	 (Nee	 1998,	 p.	 88).	 The	 range	 of	 the	 possible	 dimensions	 of	 conflict	 between	 rules	 is	
consequently	not	examined.	Moreover,	the	notion	of	“decoupling”	seems	essentially	able	to	describe	only	
specific	organizational	structures.	
The	New	 Institutional	 Economics	 (along	with	Austrian	 subjectivism	 and	 Public	 Choice	 theory)	 inspires	
Pejovich’s	 “interaction	 thesis”.	 Institutions	 consist	 of	 formal	 and	 informal	 components	 characterised	 by	
four	 types	 of	 relationship:	 1)	 formal	 institutions	 can	 suppress,	 but	 cannot	 change,	 informal	 institutions,	
which	 implies	that	the	attempt	by	formal	rules	to	change	 informal	norms	will	 fail,	and	that	the	 latter	will	
persist	for	a	long	time;	2)	formal	and	informal	rules	can	be	in	conflict;	3)	formal	rules	can	be	either	ignored	
or	rendered	neutral,	as	happens	when	people	refer	to	social	norms	to	resolve	disputes	instead	of	resorting	
to	the	legal	system;	4)	formal	and	informal	norms	can	coexist	in	harmony	(Pejovich,	1999,	pp.	170-1).	This	
typology,	rather	than	focusing	on	criteria	which	govern	the	relationships	between	kinds	of	norm,	describes	
some	institutional	phenomena.	But	it	is	precisely	these	criteria	that	are	in	need	of	clarification.	Relationship	
(1),	which	delineates	 a	 conflict	 between	 types	of	 norm,	 could	 apparently	 be	 included	 in	 relationship	 (2),	
also	 because	 Pejovich	 himself	 admits	 that	 the	 difference	 between	 (1)	 and	 (2)	 is	 “merely	 one	 of	 degree”	
(1999,	p.	170).	By	 contrast,	 the	 two	kinds	of	 relationship	are	dealt	with	 separately.	The	various	 forms	of	
conflict	between	types	of	norms	are	examined	to	only	a	limited	extent,	with	the	consequence	that,	as	for	
Nee	 (1998),	 it	 is	unclear	what	 criteria	 are	 involved	 in	 this	 typology.	Pejovich	 remarks	 that	 in	many	 cases	
formal	rules	have	failed	to	change	informal	rules.	This	implies	that	informal	norms	survive	within	systems	of	
alternative	 formal	 norms	 –	 as	 illustrated	 by	 the	 history	 of	 the	 Serbs,	 who	 preserved	 their	 informal	
institutions	for	five	centuries	under	Turkish	domination.	However,	the	survival	of	a	group’s	informal	norms	
is	 not	 a	 sufficient	 condition	 to	 establish	whether	 these	 norms	 are	 really	 in	 conflict	with	 formal	 rules,	 or	
whether	they	are	in	some	way	integrated	into	them.	Similarly,	the	reasons	for	the	neutralisation	of	certain	
formal	 rules	 (relationship	 (3)),	 and	 the	 exact	 meaning	 of	 the	 “harmony”	 between	 formal	 and	 informal	
norms	 (relationship	 (4)),	 could	 be	 discussed	 in	more	 detail.	 Here	 “harmony”	 is	 viewed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
process	which	 leads	 to	 the	 legal	 institutionalisation	of	 informal	 rules.	But	 this	 evolution	 sometimes	does	
not	 occur.	 In	 this	 case,	 formal	 norms	 do	 not	 replace	 informal	 norms,	 although	 both	 kinds	 of	 norm	
cooperate	harmoniously.	
New	Institutionalism	has	also	 influenced	political	science,	and	comparative	studies	 in	particular.	Lauth	
(2000,	pp.	23-6)	observes	that	in	democracies	formal	and	informal	institutions3	exhibit	three	different	kinds	
of	 relationship	 (i.e.	 complementary,	 conflicting	 and	 substitutive),	 and	 Helmke	 and	 Levitsky	 (2004),	 who	
expand	Lauth’s	typology,	add	to	these	a	fourth	type	(i.e.,	accommodating).	Their	analysis	of	the	four	kinds	
of	interaction	concerns	two	interrelated	dimensions:	the	degree	to	which	formal	and	informal	institutions	
converge	 or	 diverge,	 and	 the	 effectiveness	 or	 ineffectiveness	 of	 formal	 rules.	 Complementary	 informal	
institutions	make	it	possible	to	deal	with	contingencies	not	covered	by	formal	rules.	They	reinforce	formal	
rules	 and	 provide	 incentives	 to	 enforce	 them. Accommodating informal institutions modify but do not 
breach formal norms, “they contradict the spirit, but not the letter, of the formal rules” (p. 729). Competing 
informal institutions emerge when formal norms are ineffective and are ignored or violated by actors. An 
example is post-war Italian corruption, perceived as a norm alternative to the law of the state but which 
individuals choose to follow. Substitutive informal institutions arise when formal rules are weak and when 
the State exhibits a lack of authority.  
Helmke	and	Levitsky	(2004,	p.	726) are “concerned only with political rules of the game”, and not – like 
this paper – with how norms prove to be an essential component of social and economic institutions.	Their	
treatment	 –	 although	 valuable	 in	 many	 respects	 –	 only	 partially	 focuses on principles which explain 
relationships between formal and informal institutions. This is probably the cause of some methodological 
problems. For example, it is not clear from a methodological point of view why “substitution” is considered 
to be a distinct notion, rather than a special case of “complementarity”. As “complementary informal 
institutions”, “substitutive informal institutions” are employed by actors who “seek outcomes compatible 
with formal rules and procedures” (p. 729). In this way, they “fill the gap” left by fragile formal institutions, 
as in the case of the informal rondas campesinas (self-defence patrols), which in northern Peru replaced 
inadequate police protection (p.	729). Therefore, the weakness of formal institutions is seen as a condition 
which allows the emergence of relationships of complementarity.4	
A similar reasoning also applies to the conceptual pair “accommodating” and “competing informal 
institutions”. Both these terms refer to a large area of conflict between norms, and as such they should not be 
considered as separate notions. However, when accommodating institutions “help to reconcile […] actor’s 
																																								 																				
3 In this literature the expression ‘formal/informal institutions’ usually replaces ‘formal/informal norms’. 
4 This feature is also shared by “competing informal insti tutions”; but in this case the weakness of formal institutions 
allows the expansion of informal institutions based on phenomena such as clientelism, patrimonialism and corruption, 
which deteriorate formal norms. 
interests” (p. 729), they work as complementary institutions.  
The	above-mentioned	classifications	differ	from	the	approach	presented	in	this	paper,	which	examines	
the	 relationships	 between	 formal	 and	 social	 norms	 in	 regard	more	 to	 their	 impact	 on	 the	 social	 lives	 of	
individuals	and	in	terms	of	single	rules	than	their	influence	on	the	political	sphere	and	on	society	as	whole	
(as	in	Hayek’s	and	North’s	views,	and	in	analyses	of	political	systems),	although	both	perspectives	concern	
the	 institutional	 bases	 of	 social	 systems.5	 Moreover,	 although	 these	 typologies	 are	 accurate	 in	 many	
respects,	 they	 do	 not sufficiently develop a perspective able to clarify the criteria on which they are 
constructed (a gap that this paper tries to fill) . One consequence is the proliferation of concepts that, 
although able to describe a variety of empirical cases, do not delineate a clear logic governing the 
relationships between formal and informal norms.	 This	 paper	 suggests	 that	 such	 a	 basic	 simple	 logic	 is	
rooted	in	the	notions	of	complementarity	and	conflict,	two	theoretical	criteria	which	are	discussed	in	the	
following	sections.6		
	
3.	 Relationships	between	social	norms	and	legal	norms	
	
The	 boundaries	 between	 legal	 and	 social	 norms	 are	 often	 nuanced,	 and	 it	 is	 empirically	 difficult	 to	
establish	whether	behaviours	such	as	not	smoking	in	certain	public	spaces	derive	from	sensitivity	to	social	
norms	 or,	 alternatively,	 from	 the	 fear	 of	 legal	 sanctions	 (or	 from	 both).	 Although	 boundaries	 can	 be	
uncertain,	in	situations	of	this	kind,	social	and	legal	norms	perform	complementary	functions,	and	since	this	
complementarity	contributes	to	social	coordination	it	may	be	interpreted	as	a	sort	of	cooperation	between	
two	 kinds	 of	 norms	 which	 exhibit	 different	 features.	 As	 a	 first	 approximation,	 two	 different	 kinds	 of	
complementarity	may	be	distinguished:	a)	complementarity	which	admits	replacement	between	legal	and	
social	norms	(henceforth	C1);	and	b)	complementarity	which	does	not	admit	replacement	(henceforth	C2).7	
																																								 																				
5 Voigt and Engerer (2002, p. 136) also provide a classification inspired by the New Institutional Economics, but they 
do not specify the conceptual terms by means of which their concise scheme is constructed. 
6 One exception is Kostrisky (2013), who considers some methodological problems. See also Zasu (2007) and Azari and 
Smith (2012). 
7 The notion of “institutional complementarity” is at the core of institutional comparative analysis, an approach which 
studies the diversity of capitalism, and develops Aoki’s (1994) analysis. Institutional complementarity indicates that the 
efficiency of an institution A is influenced by the presence of another institution B, and vice versa (Amable, 2003 p. 6; 
Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 17). Economic systems differ because they are not random collections of institutional forms 
working in isolation but sets of complementary institutions (Amable 2003, p. 6). This concept differs in many respects 
from the notion of complementarity that I use in this paper. I focus on complementarity between kinds of norms, rather 
than on institutions like labour markets, training institutions, and financial systems. This entails an analysis of how, in 
each institution, formal and informal norms are complementary or in conflict. Moreover, the varieties of capitalism 
approach is “actor-centred” (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 6), while my approach is centred on norms and on how these 
condition individual behaviours. For this reason, I do not adopt the notion of agents’ “strategic interaction” (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, p. 5; Amable 2003, p. 41). However, if the focus is shifted to norms, the general idea of 
	3.1 Complementarity which admits replacement (C1) 
	
The	 law	 cannot	 prescribe	 (or	 proscribe)	 human	 behaviour	 in	 every	 detail.	 Consequently,	 a	 certain	
amount	of	space	remains	for	the	role	of	social	norms	in	supporting	and	reinforcing	legal	action.	When	the	
law	 prohibits	 specific	 actions	 or	 produces	 incentives,	 it	 does	 not	 define	 all	 the	 contexts	 in	 which	
prohibitions	and	incentives	have	to	be	enforced.	This	condition	implies	that	social	norms	can	intervene	in	
areas	contiguous	to	the	law	–	where	the	law	is	silent	–	and	reinforce	its	operation.	These	two	kinds	of	rules	
not	only	coexist;	they	also	cooperate,	and	their	proximity	under	certain	conditions	implies	that	the	former	
may	erode	the	latter.	
Let	us	suppose	that	the	law	prohibits	smoking	in	cinemas.	This	legal	prohibition	is	given	additional	force	
by	an	unwritten	social	norm	which	suggests	that	smoking	should	be	avoided	in	many	other	situations:	for	
example,	in	public	gardens	where	children	or	pregnant	women	might	be	present.8	The	two	types	of	norm	
are	consistent,	and	they	reinforce	each	other.	In	a	sense,	the	entire	area	of	sanctions	consists	of	legal	and	
social	 sanctions,	 where	 the	 more	 one	 component	 increases,	 the	 more	 the	 other	 is	 reduced.	 If	 the	 law	
subsequently	 changes	 (and	 gradually	 bans	 smoking	 in	 restaurants,	 public	 offices,	 train	 stations,	 public	
gardens,	etc.),	the	need	for	penalties	imposed	by	social	norms	diminishes	or	changes.	One	function	of	the	
social	norm	(that	is,	preventing	or	limiting	a	certain	behaviour)	has	been	eroded	by,	and	incorporated	into,	
a	 legal	norm.	However,	the	social	norm	does	not	vanish,	because	 it	continues	to	perform	other	functions	
contiguous	 to	 the	 law,	 such	as	communicating	disapproval.	Only	one	specific	 function	of	 the	social	norm	
decays,	while	 the	others	persist.	 Therefore,	 the	 social	 norm	 redefines	 its	 role	 and	 the	 spaces	 in	which	 it	
operates;	consequently,	the	relation	of	complementarity	between	legal	and	social	norms	is	also	redefined.	
The	process	of	substitution	also	operates	in	the	reverse	direction,	when	social	norms	replace	formal	norms.	
The	 norm	 ‘defend	members	 of	 your	 community’	 can	 be	 applied	 by	 informal	 organisations	 such	 as	 self-
defence	patrols	instead	of	by	the	police	if	the	latter	are	too	weak	to	perform	this	function.	
Another	aspect	is	involved	in	type	C1	relationships.	Although	legal	and	social	norms	cooperate,	they	also	
virtually	compete	in	establishing	the	part	that	each	of	them	plays	in	penalising	people	who	do	not	abide	by	
certain	 behavioural	 rules.	 They	 tend,	 as	 it	 were,	 toward	 the	 same	 end	 (for	 example,	 the	 prohibition	 of	
smoking),	but	the	determination	of	the	extent	of	the	spaces	occupied	by	legal	and	social	norms	respectively	
in	performing	the	function	of	prevention	depends	on	a	sort	of	competition	between	them.	
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																								
complementarity (that one institution reinforces the other), is shared by my approach, which describes how under 
certain conditions one kind of norm reinforces the other. 
8 However, the social norm, too, can receive additional force from the law, since if the latter prohibits smoking in 
restaurants, this gives strength to sanctions imposed by social norm in analogous situations. 
Rules	on	recycling,	wearing	seatbelts	in	cars,	or	using	helmets	while	riding	motorcycles	are	all	examples	
of	 social	 norms	 which	 can	 became	 legal	 norms.	 Complementarity	 of	 type	 C1	 can	 be	 described	 as	 the	
interaction	of	legal	and	social	norms.	If	a	legal	norm	expands	its	sphere	in	relation	to	a	specific	function,	the	
social	 norm	 loses	 part	 of	 its	 domain	 of	 enforcement	 and,	 in	 the	 new	 circumstances,	 the	 legal	 norm	
regulates	behaviour	previously	regulated	by	the	social	norm:	the	more	a	legal	norm	incorporates	a	function	
of	a	social	norm,	the	more	it	erodes	the	role	played	by	the	social	norm.	This	entails	a	sort	of	competition	
between	the	two	kinds	of	rule	in	order	to	establish	which	of	them	performs	a	certain	function;	but	at	the	
same	time	it	implies	that	there	is	strict	homogeneity	between	the	two	kinds	of	rule,	because	this	condition	
allows	one	 to	 replace	 the	other.	 In	principle,	 this	process	of	 substitution	will	end	when	a	 legal	norm	has	
completely	replaced	a	social	norm;	that	 is,	when	that	particular	function	previously	performed	by	a	social	
norm	has	been	completely	incorporated	into	a	legal	norm.	However,	it	is	evident	that	this	is	not	a	necessary	
outcome.	
Many	authors	have	pointed	out	that	the	replaceability	of	social	norms	with	legal	norms	derives	from	the	
fact	that	law	is	moulded	on	the	basis	of	preceding	informal	norms.	This	tradition	of	thought	includes	Hume,	
Burke,	 von	 Savigny,	 Maine,	 and	 many	 others.	 Hayek,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 group	 selection,	
interpreted	 this	 process	 in	 evolutionary	 terms.	 In	 other	 cases,	 the	 idea	 that	 legal	 institutions	 are	
consequences	of	previous	 social	norms	does	not	 refer	 to	evolutionary	 schemes;	 rather,	 it	 is	a	 conclusion	
deriving	 from	 game-theoretic	 approaches	 (Sugden,	 1989)	 or	 from	 historical	 analysis	 (North,	 1990).	
However,	the	condition	of	strict	homogeneity	involved	when	a	legal	norm	replaces	a	social	norm	does	not	
centre	on	the	general	 relationship	between	 informal	and	formal	norms	 in	society	pointed	out	by	authors	
such	as	Hayek	and	North;	 rather,	more	 limitedly,	 it	concerns	the	relationships	between	single	 (social	and	
legal)	norms.		
The	 evolutionary	 view	of	 institutions	 has	 been	 criticised,	 and	 this	 has	 led	 to	 re-consideration	 of	 how	
formal	norms	influence	and	give	shape	to	informal	rules.	Legal	scholars	have	analysed	the	reverse	process	–	
that	is,	how	law	influences	and	even	modifies	social	norms	(see	Sunstein,	1996a;	McAdam	1997,	p.	342)	–	
and	they	have	pointed	out	that	law	is	not	a	mere	extension	of	customs.9		
Social	and	legal	norms	sometimes	do	not	interact.	When	they	appear	separately,	two	cases	have	to	be	
taken	 into	consideration:	1)	 the	predominance	of	a	 legal	norm,	which	can	be	–	but	not	necessarily	 is	–	a	
consequence	of	a	process	of	substitution;	2)	the	predominance	of	a	social	norm	as	a	norm	which	regulates	
a	behaviour	without	the	help	of	law.	In	this	regard,	North	(1990,	p.	38)	observes	that,	at	institutional	level,	
“In	the	absence	of	the	state	and	formal	rules,	a	dense	social	network	leads	to	the	development	of	informal	
structures	with	substantial	stability”.	In	short,	except	for	extreme	cases	in	which	either	legal	or	social	norms	
dominate,	 it	 frequently	occurs	 that	 legal	 and	 social	 norms	 interact.	 This	 latter	 situation	has	a	number	of	
																																								 																				
9 For a general analysis of contemporary studies on social norms and law, see Mercuro and Medema (2006, pp. 306-41). 
gradations,	 in	which	the	extent	of	the	space	occupied	by	one	kind	of	norm	varies	 in	comparison	with	the	
other,	and	implies	that	behaviours	can	be	more	sensitive	to	one	than	the	other,	although	both	cooperate	
with	and	reinforce	each	other.		
Relationships	 between	 legal	 and	 social	 rules	 cannot	 always	 be	 labelled	 in	 terms	 of	 C1,	 since	 certain	
components	of	 social	norms	and	certain	conventions,	 although	 they	are	complementary	with	 legal	 rules,	
cannot	be	replaced	by	law.	This	is	type	C2	complementarity.	
	
3.2 Complementarity which does not admit replacement (C2) 
	
Fining	people	who	smoke	in	places	where	it	is	prohibited	may	be	interpreted	as	a	transformation	of	the	
breach	of	a	norm	into	a	market	transaction,	where	the	fine	can	be	interpreted	by	the	individuals	involved	
as	the	price	paid	for	smoking	(Fehr	and	Falk,	2002,	p.	711).	This	may	suggest	that,	by	means	of	fines,	the	
law	neutralises	the	moral	view	incorporated	in	a	social	norm	and	that	smoking	in	forbidden	areas	does	not	
give	 rise	 to	 disapproval	 when	 a	monetary	 sanction	 is	 imposed.10	 However,	 the	monetization	 of	 a	 social	
norm	 (i.e.	 its	 replacement	 with	 a	 formal	 one)	 is	 not	 always	 possible,	 and	 sanctions	 cannot	 always	 be	
equated	to	fines	or	prices.	Robert	Cooter	(1984)	criticizes	the	propensity	of	economists	to	view	law	as	“a	
set	of	official	prices”,	and	to	think	that	sanctions	are	prices.11	This	is	erroneous,	since	prices	are	perceived	
as	 external	 constraints,	 while	 sanctions	 refer	 to	 obligations	 perceived	 as	 social	 norms.	 Moreover,	 “A	
sanction	is	a	detriment	imposed	for	doing	what	is	forbidden,	such	as	failing	to	perform	an	obligation”,	while	
“a	price	is	a	payment	of	money	which	is	required	in	order	to	do	what	is	permitted”	(pp.	1524-5;	emphasis	in	
the	 original).	 This	 distinction	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 specify	 the	 different	 social	 meanings	 embodied	 in	
sanctions	(such	as	imprisonment)	and	fines	(such	as	prices)	and	to	focus	on	the	“expressive	dimension”	of	
punishment.	 Punishment,	 Kahan	 (1996)	maintains,	 is	 a	 convention	 that	 conveys	moral	 condemnation	 by	
society	 and	 reaffirms	 the	 values	 that	 the	wrongdoer	denies.	 Fines	 express	 these	messages	 less	potently,	
and	condemn	much	more	ambivalently.	In	short,	“Imprisonment,	as	a	sanction,	invariably	condemns;	fines,	
when	viewed	as	prices,	do	not”	(p.	621).12	
																																								 																				
10 Moral norms are often viewed as a subclass of social norms (see Hausman and McPherson, 2006, p. 81, Shavell, 
2002, p. 23, note 5; Cooter, 1988, p. 586). 
11	This	view	is	put	forward	by	Gary	Becker	(1968,	p.	195),	and	it	is	shared	by	R.	Posner	(1980).	
12 The relationships among prices, fines and social norms can be illustrated as follows. Fines and prices do not convey 
the same meaning and perform different functions. Fines are usually attached to moral disapproval (see Sandel, 2013, 
pp. 128-129), while prices usually are not. In their turn, fines are not social sanctions for the same reason: they convey 
the social view of punishment imperfectly but more effectively than prices. 
These	 considerations	 may	 usefully	 serve	 to	 formulate	 a	 concept	 which	 has	 not	 emerged	 in	 these	
debates:	the	relationship	between	legal	and	social	norms	is	characterised	by	a	complementarity	of	type	C2.	
This	occurs	when	the	expressive	function	of	a	social	convention	or	norm	cannot	be	eroded	by	law	because	
its	social	meaning	cannot	be	transferred	to	penalties	such	as	fines	(owing	to	the	lack	of	strict	homogeneity).	
More	 generally,	 when	 the	 law	 cannot	 neutralise	 or	 eradicate	 the	 moral	 disapproval	 attached	 to	 social	
norms,	 the	 relationships	 between	 different	 kinds	 of	 norms	 involve	 a	 type	 C2	 complementarity.	 This	 is	
coherent	 with	 the	 view	 suggested	 in	 the	 previous	 section:	 C1	 complementarity	 entails	 that	 only	 one	
function	of	a	social	norm	(for	example,	preventing	a	certain	behaviour)	can	be	eroded,	while	others	–	not	
eradicable	 by	 law	 –	 persist	 (for	 example,	 conveying	 disapproval).	 Therefore,	 the	 latter	 are	 included	 in	
complementarity	of	type	C2.	
C2	 complementarity	 appears	 in	 situations	 where	 conventions,	 customs	 and	 traditions	 are	 the	
complements	of	social,	political	and	legal	acts,	but	are	not	replaceable	by	law.		
Norbert	Elias	([1969]	1994)	has	shown	how	rules	of	etiquette	are	crucial	for	understanding	the	process	
of	Western	civilization.	The	emergence	of	political,	economic	and	legal	systems	does	not	constitute	the	only	
factor	able	 to	shape	a	society;	 rather,	“civilization”	 is	probably	better	understood	 in	 light	of	other	subtle	
and	pervasive	processes	which	connote	it.	In	fact,	civilization	is	largely	characterized	by	a	number	of	rules	
which	are	fundamental	traits	of	social	systems	and	are	not	legally	prescribable,	such	as,	for	example,	good	
table	 manners	 and	 dress	 codes.	 These	 kinds	 of	 norms	 are	 mostly	 social	 conventions	 exhibiting	 two	
characteristics	which	differentiate	 them	 from	other	 socially	 shared	 rules:	 they	are	obeyed	because	other	
people	 are	 obeying	 them,	 and	 they	 are	 in	 some	 degree	 arbitrary	 (Dequech	 2009,	 p.	 73).13	 By	means	 of	
symbolic	 behaviours,	 conventions	 signal	 certain	 attitudes	 (in	 the	 same	 way	 as	 saluting	 the	 flag	 signals	
loyalty	and	patriotism),	and	communicate	whether	or	not	individuals	are	co-operators	(i.e.,	patriots	or	not)	
(E.	Posner,	1998),	even	if	there	is	no	intrinsic	reason	why	one	signal	should	be	used	rather	than	another.	
Lévi-Strauss	pointed	out	that	some	contemporary	social	conventions	and	norms	derive	from	the	social	
practices	of	primitive	communities,	whose	 functions	have	been	 inherited.	Their	present	 form,	apparently	
obscure	 and	 characterised	by	 arbitrary	 symbolic	 behaviours,	 derives	 from	ancient	 ceremonials.	 Although	
reciprocal	 gift-giving	 has	 lost	 its	 original	 social,	 religious,	 magical	 and	 economic	 meanings,	 certain	
conventions	and	customs	 in	contemporary	societies	evoke	 the	ancient	conception	of	exchange.	Dinner	 is	
“offered”	 to	 a	 person	 one	wishes	 to	 honour,	 and	 this	 behaviour	 can	 be	 a	 way	 of	 “returning”	 an	 act	 of	
kindness.	Things	offered	to	the	guest,	 like	good	food	and	good	wine,	and	objects	used	in	his/her	honour,	
																																								 																				
13 According to Lewis (1969), conventions do not derive from explicit agreements; rather, they emerge from repeated 
coordination games, and from shared knowledge on behavioural regularities that coordinate individual actions. On this 
view, they are solutions to coordination problems and, as Sugden (1989) maintains, it is rational to follow a convention, 
even though it is only one of the several solutions of a game. 
like	tablecloths	habitually	stored	away	in	cupboards,	are	part	of	the	ceremonial	(Lévi-Strauss,	[1949]	1969,	
pp.	52-68).		
These	conventions	cannot	be	replaced	by	legal	prescriptions,	and	they	constitute	a	framework	in	which	
legal	rules	are	created	and	find	support.	More	than	being	the	‘rules	of	the	game’	which	give	shape	to	social	
coordination	 and	 regulate	 behaviours,	 roles,	 and	 hierarchies,	 they	 support	 other	 norms	 that	 more	
effectively	perform	these	functions.	In	short,	some	informal	norms	of	kindness,	politeness,	appropriateness	
of	behaviour,	etc.,	 reinforce	 the	 sense	of	belonging	 to	a	 community,	 reduce	conflicts	between	groups	or	
political	 parties,	 convey	 consensus	 on	 democratic	 procedures,	 facilitate	 cooperation,	 and	 help	 the	
application	 of	 laws.	 They	 also	 favour	 social	 coordination	 by	 supporting	 social	 norms,	 and	 cannot	 be	
replaced	by	 legal	 norms	because	 they	operate	within	 a	 social	 and	 cultural	 space	which	 is	 fundamentally	
different	from	that	of	laws.	Hence	there	is	no	strict	homogeneity	between	the	two	types	of	rules,	and	the	
relation	between	social	and	legal	norms	does	not	evolve	in	the	direction	of	the	replacement	of	the	social	
norm.	
	
3.3 Conflicts	between	norms	
	
Social	norms	not	only	take	on	a	complementary	form	with	respect	to	law,	as	shown	by	C1	and	C2;	they	
also	often	conflict	with	legal	rules.		
The	conflict	between	norms	can	assume	two	forms.	The	first	 is	 “prohibition”,	which	takes	place	when	
one	 kind	 of	 norm	 prohibits	 specific	 behaviours	 recommended	 by	 the	 other	 type	 of	 norm.	 The	 second	
emerges	when	the	two	kinds	of	norms	are	mutually	exclusive,	and	adherence	to	one	norm	crowds	out	the	
other.	 In	 this	 case,	 there	 is	 no	 prohibition,	 but	 simply	 incompatibility	 between	 norms	 which	 cannot	 be	
enforced	at	the	same	time.	While	complementarity	of	type	C1	and	C2	are	describable	as	 ‘legal	and	social	
norms’,	the	two	aspects	of	conflict	are	summarised	as	‘legal	or	social	norms’.	
Duelling	and	codes	of	revenge	are	examples	of	social	norms	which	conflict	with	(and	are	prohibited	by)	
legal	norms.14	One	intriguing	question	is	how	the	coexistence	of	these	kinds	of	rules	can	be	explained,	given	
that	each	 individual	 is	 supposed	 to	abide	by	 them	notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 they	are	 in	conflict	with	
each	 other,	 as	 happened	 when	 people	 with	 institutional	 roles	 fought	 duels	 to	 resolve	 disputes	 and	
perceived	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 rules	 as	 equally	 legitimate,	 although	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 the	 law	
																																								 																				
14 Law can prohibit adherence to social norms, and in turn social norms can stigmatise behaviours favoured or ruled by 
law.  
prohibited	duelling	in	many	countries.15	One	may	assume	that	the	two	different	kinds	of	norms	respond	to	
social	and	cultural	demands	in	 incompatible	ways;	nevertheless,	 it	 is	not	clear	why	two	(and,	 in	principle,	
more	than	two)	alternative	systems	of	rules,	which	are	outcomes	of	the	same	history	and	the	same	culture,	
should	 be	 enforceable	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 This	 reinforces	 the	 idea	 that	 formal	 norms	 are	 not	 simply	
complementary	 extensions	 of	 informal	 norms	 (Hodgson,	 2009),	 and	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 conflict	 between	
different	 norms	 reveals	 problems	 that	 are	 not	 examined	 by	 authors	 such	 as	Hayek	 and	North.	 Although	
prohibition	 characterises	 antagonism	 between	 different	 kinds	 of	 norms,	 conflict	 can	 in	 practice	 assume	
nuanced	 forms.	 Informal	norms	embodied	 in	 corruption,	 clientelism,	political	 patronage	and	 clan	politics	
corrode	legal	and	formal	norms,	and	are	sanctioned	by	law;	but	at	same	time	they	prosper	thanks	to	formal	
institutions,	from	which	they	extract	resources	(Lauth	2000,	pp.	25-6).	Therefore,	the	term	“conflict”	(in	the	
sense	 of	 “prohibition”)	 indicates	 that	 the	 two	 kinds	 of	 norms	 are	 in	 principle	 opposite	 to	 each	 other,	
although	in	real	life	they	coexist	more	or	less	precariously.	
Relations	of	conflict	can	assume	a	less	radical	form,	which	implies	mutual	exclusiveness	between	kinds	
of	norms,	but	not	prohibition.	Mutual	exclusiveness	means	that	a	person	can	choose	what	type	of	rule	to	
adopt,	where	 the	available	 kinds	of	norms	are	 related	 to	alternative	motivations.	 Suppose	 that	 a	man	 is	
attacked	by	his	neighbour’s	son,	who	has	drunk	too	much,	in	consequence	of	a	quarrel	about	parking.	The	
man,	who	is	a	friend	of	the	aggressor’s	father	and	knows	that	his	family	is	going	through	a	difficult	period,	
decides	 not	 to	 report	 the	 neighbour’s	 son	 to	 the	 police.	 Social	 norm	 and	 law,	 from	which	 there	 follow	
alternative	 behaviours,	 are	 available	 at	 the	 same	 time	 and	 can	 be	 freely	 pursued,	 yet	 one	 type	 of	 rule	
makes	the	other	unusable.		
The	same	phenomenon	is	observable	at	the	social	and	institutional	levels,	when	customs	and	extra-legal	
agreements	dominate	because	the	corresponding	law	is	not	enforced.	It	is	in	this	sense	that	it	is	possible	to	
reformulate	Robert	C.	Ellickson’s	 (1991)	analysis,	which	shows	how	ranchers	 in	Shasta	County,	California,	
resolved	disputes	arising	over	cattle	trespass	of	boundary	fences	by	resorting	to	informal	norms	instead	of	
relying	 on	 laws,	 although	 the	 latter	 were	 available	 (see	 also	 Bernstein,	 1992).	 In	 addition,	 comparative	
studies	have	shown	that	this	scenario	can	emerge	when	State	structures	and	formal	authority	are	weak.	
Finally,	 the	outcome	of	mutual	exclusiveness	must	not	be	confused	with	 the	possible	outcome	of	 the	
evolution	 of	 the	 cooperative	 relationship	 between	 social	 and	 formal	 norms	 (C1	 complementarity,	which	
implies	 ‘replacement’),	 although	 both	 outcomes	 show	 the	 prevalence	 of	 one	 kind	 of	 norm	 and	 the	
disappearance	 of	 the	 other.	 In	mutual	 exclusiveness,	 in	 consequence	 of	 the	 conflict	 between	 social	 and	
formal	 norms,	 the	 adoption	 of	 one	 kind	 of	 norm	 implies	 the	 rejection	 and	 not	 the	 replacement	 of	 the	
alternative	rule.	Alternatively,	the	prevalence	‘by	replacement’	of	one	kind	of	norm,	which	arises	from	C1	
																																								 																				
15 Alexander Hamilton was killed in a duel in 1804, and Felice Cavallotti, a member of the Italian parliament of the 
kingdom of Italy, died in 1898 after fighting a duel, although duelling was prohibited by Italian law.  
complementarity,	is	possible	not	because	the	alternative	type	of	norm	has	been	rejected,	but	because	one	
of	its	functions	has	been	incorporated.		
	
3.4 Moveable	boundaries	between	norms	in	space	and	in	time	
	
The	 boundaries	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	 complementarity	 and	 between	 these	 and	 the	 conflicting	
relationships	between	social	rules	and	law	are	moveable	–	as	the	following	situations,	 in	reference	to	the	
use	 of	 seatbelts,	 illustrate.	 In	many	Western	 countries	 this	 behaviour	 involves	 the	 relationship	 between	
type	C1	social	and	legal	norms,	since	the	informal	norm	which	once	suggested	the	use	of	seatbelts	has	been	
transformed	into	a	legal	prescription.	But,	in	other	countries,	this	norm	remains	a	rule	of	good	sense,	which	
tends	not	to	assume	the	form	of	a	law.16	In	this	case,	it	can	be	included	in	C2	if	a	social	norm	complements	
legal	 rules	but	does	not	 exhibit	 a	 tendency	 to	be	 replaced	by	 a	 law.	 Finally,	 the	 legal	 prescription	which	
imposes	the	use	of	seatbelts	may	conflict	with	a	social	norm,	as	 in	the	case	described	by	Lessig	 (1995,	p.	
952),	where	wearing	a	seatbelt	in	a	taxi	in	Budapest	during	the	1990s	was	an	insult	to	the	driver.	
The	scheme	below	summarises	the	relationships	between	legal-formal	rules	and	informal	social	norms.		
	
	
Legal	 and	 social	
norms	
Relationships	of	complementarity	of	types	C1	and	C2.	
Predominance	 of	
the	legal	norm	
	
Predominance	 of	
the	social	norm	
	
These	constitute	the	extreme	possibilities	of	‘legal	and	social	norms’,	when	one	of	
the	 components	 (either	 a	 legal	 norm	 or	 a	 social	 norm)	 predominates.	 If,	 as	 a	
consequence	 of	 the	 erosion	 of	 the	 social	 norm,	 a	 legal	 norm	prevails,	 then	 the	
previous	situation	(‘legal	and	social	norms’)	denotes	type	C1	complementarity.	
	
	
Legal	 or	 social	
norms	
Relationships	 of	 conflict	 between	 kinds	 of	 norms	 both	 as	 prohibition	 and	 as	
mutual	exclusiveness.	
	
	
																																								 																				
16 The relationship between formal and informal norms becomes more complex if one considers non-Western countries. 
However, such an analysis would fall outside the scope of this essay. 
	4.		 Formal	rules	and	informal	social	norms	in	the	economic	sphere	
	
In	the	economic	sphere,	and	specifically	in	the	market,	the	relationships	between	different	types	of	rules	
exhibit	features	similar	to	those	characterizing	legal	and	social	norms,	since	transactions	take	place	within	
legal	and	formal	frameworks	which	regulate	exchanges	by	means	of	contracts	and	through	the	definition	of	
property	rights.	For	this	reason,	North	(1990,	p.	47)	points	out	that	economic	rules	which	define	property	
rights	and	contracts	must	be	included	within	a	larger	class	of	formal	norms	along	with	political	and	judicial	
rules.	 In	his	view,	exchanges	 in	modern	market	societies,	where	bargaining	 is	a	complex	activity,	must	be	
accompanied	by	third-party	enforcement,	and	by	institutions	that	enforce	agreements	through	the	threat	
of	coercion.	Consequently,	 legal	and	economic	norms	facilitate	exchanges,	and	they	are	enforced	by	legal	
and	political	decision-making.	
Since	transactions	in	the	economic	sphere	are	ultimately	guaranteed	by	legal	institutions,	I	will	use	the	
expression	“market	norms”	to	summarise	the	idea	that	exchanges	in	the	market	are	structured	in	a	formal	
way,	and	that	these	formal	aspects	of	the	market	are	usually	associated	with	a	monetary	dimension	(see	
Ariely,	 2008,	 p.	 68).	 However,	 the	 behaviour	 of	 individuals	 as	 economic	 agents	 is	 also	 influenced	 by	
informal	 social	 norms,	 which	 guide	 their	 behaviours	 especially	 when	 contracts	 are	 incomplete.	 As	 a	
consequence,	complementarity	and	conflict	characterise	relationships	between	market	and	social	norms.	
These	 themes	 are	 present	 in	 Karl	 Polanyi17,	 although	 1)	 he	 does	 not	 make	 explicit	 the	 concepts	 of	
complementarity	 and	 conflict;	 2)	 his	 analysis	 focuses	 mainly	 on	 institutions	 as	 a	 whole	 rather	 than	 on	
norms.	His	fundamental	work,	The	Great	Transformation	(1944),	is	an	analysis	of	the	“double	movement”,	
that	 is,	 the	 struggle	 between	 forces	 which	 support	 the	 self-regulating	 market,	 and	 forces	 which	 try	 to	
protect	society	from	the	inequality	and	degradations	caused	by	the	market	(Polanyi	[1944],	2001,	pp.	139-
40).	Polanyi	 interprets	 this	 conflict	 as	manifesting	 the	 fact	 that,	 in	modern	market	economies,	 economic	
activities	tend	to	be	separated	from	the	social	sphere.	In	response	to	this	tendency,	society	tries	to	defend	
itself	and	to	“re-embed”	economic	activity	in	the	social	domain	(Polanyi	[1944],	2001,	p.	132).	Despite	the	
tendency	of	 the	market	 to	detach	 itself	 from	other	dimensions	of	 social	 life,	 this	process	 cannot	be	 fully	
realized.	The	idea	of	a	self-regulating	market	as	a	disembedded	institution	is	utopian	because	the	economy	
necessarily	interacts	with	spheres	such	as	law,	politics	and	morality.	In	general,	“The	human	economy	[…]	is	
embedded	and	enmeshed	in	institutions,	economic	and	noneconomic.	The	inclusion	of	the	noneconomic	is	
vital”	 (Polanyi	et	al.,	1957,	p.	250).	These	 reasons,	 together	with	 the	 fact	 that	market	 society	 tries	 to	 re-
																																								 																				
17 I thank a referee for directing my attention to Polanyi’s approach and its possible connections with the themes 
developed in this paper. 
embed	 the	 economy	 by	 means	 of	 social	 protection,	 explain	 why,	 according	 to	 Block	 (2003),	 Polanyi	
glimpsed,	but	did	not	develop,	the	idea	of	the	“always-embedded	market”.18	
Although	Polanyi	did	not	directly	analyse	the	relationships	between	formal-market	and	social	norms,	he	
provided	 a	 framework	 in	 which	 to	 consider	 the	 relationships	 of	 complementarity	 or	 conflict	 between	
institutional	 structures.	 The	 coexistence	 of	 economic	 and	 social	 relationships	 involves	 complementarity.	
However,	 this	 coexistence	 also	 denotes	 forms	 of	 conflict	 in	market	 economies	which	 are	 related	 to	 the	
double	movement	and	to	countermovements	which	characterise		society’s	defence	against	the	market.		
Many	 approaches	 have	 developed	 Polanyi’s	 view	 and	 refer	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 “embeddeness”	 and	
“countermovement”	 in	 order	 to	 interpret	 the	 dynamics	 of	 modern	 economies.	 According	 to	 Laville,	
Lemaître	and	Nyssen	(2006),	who	adopt	Polanyi’s	approach,	social	enterprises	are	characterised	by	socio-
political	embeddedness.	They	are	 founded	by	social	workers,	associative	militants	and	 representatives	of	
the	traditional	third	sector,	which	 in	recent	decades	has	 implemented	 labour	market	policies	 (pp.	280-2).	
Social	 economy	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 field	 which	 brings	 together	 co-operatives,	 mutual	 societies	 and	 various	
organizations	(such	as	non-profit	ones)	whose	aim	is	to	benefit	their	members	or	the	community.	Following	
Polanyi’s	 substantive	 approach	 to	 the	 economy,	 Defourny	 and	 Nyssen	 (2006,	 pp.	 10-11)	 consider	 social	
enterprises	 as	 organisations	 which	 “combine	 the	 economic	 principle	 of	 market,	 redistribution	 and	
reciprocity”.	All	 this	evokes	the	notion	of	complementarity,	 in	that	these	forms	of	social	protection	allow	
the	better	 functioning	of	economic	 relationships.	The	conflict	between	market	and	 social	 forces	has	also	
been	investigated	by	many	studies,	which	have	examined	in	Polanyian	terms	how	increasing	inequalities	in	
income,	 health	 and	 life	 chances	 have	 come	 about	 in	 recent	 decades	 (Roy	 and	 Hackett	 2016,	 p.	 2).	
Moreover,	 market	 deregulation	 has	 had	 a	 human,	 environmental	 and	 financial	 impact	 on	 “developing”	
countries	that	many	consider	to	be	harmful	and	the	origin	of	Polanyian	countermovements	(Levien	2007,	
Sandbrook	2011).	
	However,	these	perspectives	refer	to	 institutional	and	political	processes	which	are	general	 in	nature.	
Instead	the	analysis	which	follows	focuses	more	specifically	on	norms.	In	particular,	it	examines	how	in	the	
economic	sphere	the	relationships	between	formal	norms	and	informal	social	norms	can	be	interpreted	in	
terms	of	either	complementarity	or	conflict.	(type	C1	or	C2).	
	
																																								 																				
18 This point, and in general the notion of “embeddedness”, has been much discussed in the secondary literature. Lie 
(1991) maintains that Polanyi overestimated the purely economic character of market exchange, while he 
underestimated the fact that “all economic activities and institutions are embedded in social relations” (p. 219). Gemici 
(2008) remarks that Polanyi contradictorily states that all economies are embedded in institutions and that the market 
economy is disembedded. Dale (2010, p. 193) recognizes that the concept of embeddedness exhibits some ambiguities 
and that, at the methodological level, it is uncertain whether this concept is a “descriptive empirical term” or an 
“ideal type”.  
4.1		 Complementarity	of	norms	in	the	economic	sphere	
	
Scholars	belonging	to	different	schools	of	thought	implicitly	recognize	complementarity	between	social	
and	 legal-formal	 norms	 in	 economic	 relationships,	 although	 they	 have	 not	 formulated	 a	 theory	 on	 this	
phenomenon.	The	consequence	is	that	complementarity	is	not	analysed	as	a	conceptual	category,	although	
some	 approaches	 are	 compatible	 with	 this	 perspective.	 Hodgson	 (1988)	 hints	 at	 the	 notion	 of	
complementarity,	 though	 he	 does	 not	 develop	 it	 theoretically,	 when	 he	 maintains	 that	 contracts	 and	
exchanges	 are	 “a	 combination	 of	 both	 formal	 legislation	 and	 legitimation,	 and	 inherited	 custom	 and	
tradition	 of	 a	 less	 formal	 kind”	 (p.	 156).	 Contracts	 are	 integrated	 by	 customs	 and	 conventions,	 and	 this	
implies	that	“the	analysis	of	exchange	in	modern	society	has	to	be	understood	through	an	examination	of	
the	symbiotic	relationship	between	both	its	contractual	and	non-contractual	features”	(p.	167,	emphasis	in	
original).		
The	 “symbiotic	 relationship”	 between	 informal	 and	 formal	 contracts	 can	 be	 viewed	 in	 terms	 of	 their	
complementarity,	especially	in	labour	contracts,	which,	Akerlof	(1982)	maintains,	are	in	part	based	on	gift	
relationships.	 The	 gift	 from	 the	 worker	 consists	 in	 a	 work	 effort	 which	 is	 	 “in	 excess”	 of	 the	 minimum	
standard,	and	the	firm’s	gift	consists	in	wage	“in	excess”	(or	other	benefits):	that	is,	a	wage	higher	than	the	
one	prescribed	by	the	work	rules.	In	Akerlof’s	words:	“In	gift	exchange	the	usual	norm	is	that	gifts	should	be	
more	 than	 the	minimum	required	 to	keep	 the	other	party	 in	 the	exchange	relationship”	 (p.	559).	Formal	
norms	which	 determine	 the	minimum	 standard	 for	 both	workers	 and	 the	 firm,	 and	 the	 social	 norms	 of	
reciprocity	which	 regulate	what	exceeds	 it	 (and	which	give	 rise	 to	 the	gift	 from	both	 the	parties)	 can	be	
viewed	as	complementary	rules.	This	emerges	as	a	consequence	of	Akerlof’s	argument,	although	he	does	
not	analyse	this	concept	in	theoretical	terms.		
Social	norms	have	a	role	in	determining	workers’	performances,	especially	if	incomplete	contracts	allow	
degrees	of	discretion	in	work	effort,	and	cooperation	is	elicited	by	means	of	the	generous	reward	offered	
by	 employers.19	 Fehr	 and	 Gächter	 maintain	 that	 the	 social	 norm	 of	 reciprocity	 contributes	 to	 the	
enforcement	of	contracts,	and	they	argue	that	 implicit	contracts	stimulate	higher	than	expected	 levels	of	
effort,	 thus	determining	higher	profits.	The	reason	 is	 that	the	employers’	commitment	to	paying	a	bonus	
related	 to	 the	 effort	 level	 is	 based	 on	 their	 reciprocal	 inclinations	 (Fehr	 and	 Gächter,	 2000,	 p.	 177).	 By	
contrast,	explicit	(more	complete)	contracts	induce	effort	levels	that	are	lower	than	expected	because	they	
																																								 																				
19 Incomplete contracts theory, as conceived by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), develops a 
perspective whose origins are to be found in Coase, Williamson, and Klein, Crawford and Alchian, and in the concept 
of transaction costs. Contracts are incomplete for many reasons: 1) because some characteristics of transactions can be 
known only ex post; 2) because ex ante specification of costs can be excessively high in some states of the world; 3) 
because some behaviours may not be observable by a third party. This implies that some ex post opportunistic 
behaviours occur and that contractual incompleteness causes distortions in firms’ performances. These approaches, 
differently from the present paper, deal with problems of the optimal allocation of asset ownership. 
are	 likely	 to	 erode	 cooperative	 reciprocal	 behaviours.	 When	 an	 incomplete	 contract	 is	 replaced	 by	 a	
complete	(or	more	complete)	contract	as	a	result	of	the	erosion	of	the	contract	component	based	on	social	
norms,	 the	 outcome	 is	 generally	 inefficient.	 In	my	 terms,	 C1	 complementarity	 characterises	 the	 change	
from	incomplete	to	complete	contracts,	but	this	outcome	is	less	preferable	than	that	in	which	social	norms	
cooperate	with	the	formal	norms	of	the	market.20	
	Another	 case	which	 illustrates,	 but	 does	 not	 develop	 in	 conceptual	 terms,	 a	 complementarity	which	
admits	‘replacement’	is	described	by	Gneezy	and	Rustichini	(2000a),	who	studied	a	day-care	centre	in	Israel	
in	order	to	evaluate	whether	introducing	a	fine	for	parents	who	arrived	late	to	pick	up	their	children	was	a	
useful	deterrent.	They	concluded	that	the	fine	did	not	work	well.	 	Before	the	fine	was	 imposed,	teachers	
and	parents	had	an	agreement,	based	on	a	 social	norm,	about	how	 to	behave	 in	 the	event	 that	parents	
arrived	 late.	 In	 this	 way,	 when	 parents	 were	 occasionally	 late,	 they	 experienced	 feelings	 of	 guilt	 which	
induced	 them	 to	be	punctual.	When	 the	 fine	was	 introduced,	 the	 social	norm	was	 replaced	by	a	market	
norm	 (i.e.,	 a	 new	 contract).	 Now	 that	 the	 parents	were	 paying	 for	 their	 tardiness,	 they	 interpreted	 the	
situation	 in	 formal	 terms.	Since	 they	were	being	 fined,	 they	could	decide	whether	or	not	 to	be	 late,	and	
they	 frequently	 chose	 the	 former	 option.	 Eventually,	 when	 the	 fine	was	 removed,	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	
parents	did	not	change,	and	they	continued	to	pick	up	their	children	late.	
In	the	terms	that	I	have	adopted	in	this	paper,	the	relationships	between	formal	and	social	norms	before	
the	fine	were	characterized	by	complementarity,	which	admitted	a	‘replacement’	similar	to	that	previously	
identified	as	C1.	The	contract	was	incomplete	(Gneezy	and	Rustichini,	2000a,	p.	3),	because	at	first	a	social	
norm	 intervened	where	economic	exchange	 ceased;	 that	 is,	when	 the	payment	 for	day-care	 services	did	
not	include	free	(benevolent)	assistance	for	children	whose	parents	arrived	late.	After	the	introduction	of	
the	fine,	a	formal	rule	replaced	the	social	one,	and	the	relations	between	the	parties	were	entirely	ruled	by	
market	 norms.	 However,	 the	 erosion	 of	 the	 previous	 social	 norm	 did	 not	 produce	 an	 efficient	 result	
because	it	did	not	reduce	but	actually	increased	the	number	of	parents	who	arrived	late.	
Complementarity	 introduces	 a	 perspective	 whereby	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 examine	 the	 contractual	
incompleteness	and	behaviours	described	by	Gneezy	and	Rustichini.	Moreover,	it	 is	worth	noting	that	the	
characterization	of	complementarity	as	the	capacity	of	social	norms	to	fill	 the	gap	 in	formal	norms,	given	
																																								 																				
20 Adaman and Madra (2002) criticise approaches ontologically based on individualism and methodologically based on 
formalism because they represent individuals as detached from a social and institutional context. These approaches also 
support an ontology of contracts in which the market-centric view prevails, and in which the “third sphere” (which 
includes various activities which remain outside the sphere of exchange) is narrowly conceptualised as pathological and 
as supplementing contractual relationships. Adaman and Madra maintain that the notion of “homo reciprocans” 
propounded by Akerlof and Fehr and Gächter is in some way related to the ontology of contracts: that is, it reflects a 
conception of the individual as rational and calculative. However, they recognise that Akerlof “moves beyond the 
terrain of strict individualism” (p. 1065) (on this aspect see Davis (2007)). In my view, this type of revision of the 
standard approach makes it possible to reframe contributions by authors such as Akerlof, and Fehr and Gächter within 
an institutional perspective based on complementarity and conflict. 
the	 incompleteness	of	contracts,	 is	only	one	particular	case.	Social	norms	can	complement	 formal	norms	
also	when	 these	 latter	 are	well-designed.	 To	 summarise,	 C1	 complementarity	 in	 the	 economic	 field	may	
entail	that	the	replacement	of	a	social	with	a	formal	clause	assumes	the	form	of	monetisation.	This	process	
is	peculiar,	since	in	many	circumstances	the	replacement	engenders	inefficient	results;	and	for	this	reason,	
although	 erosion	 is	 possible,	 it	 is	 better	 not	 to	 destroy	 social	 norms:	 cooperation	 between	market	 and	
social	norms	is	preferable	to	domination	by	market	rules	alone	(see	Sandel,	2013),	where	this	 latter	term	
indicates	a	formal	contract	implying		a	monetary	dimension.	
However,	 social	 norms	 cannot	 always	be	 replaced	by	monetary	 compensation,	 and	when	 this	 occurs,	
the	relationship	between	norms	is	characterized	in	terms	of	type	C2	complementarity	(North,	1990,	p.	63).	
	
4.2		 Conflict	between	formal	and	informal	social	norms	in	the	market	
	
Economic	formal	norms	and	social	rules	may	be	antagonistic.	There	is	a	radical	opposition	between	legal	
and	 illegal	 markets.	 Gambling,	 prostitution,	 and	 narcotics	 markets	 “can	 continue	 only	 because	 the	
participants	 recognise	 de	 facto	 the	 property	 rights	 that	 the	 state	 does	 not”	 (Sugden,	 1989,	 p.	 86).	 They	
come	into	existence	in	consequence	of	codes	of	behaviour	that	govern	them,	and	they	persist	despite	the	
attempts	 by	 legal	 institutions	 to	 suppress	 them.	 Therefore,	 the	 form	 taken	 by	 conflict	 between	 the	 two	
systems	of	norms	implies	that	one	of	them	prohibits	a	certain	behaviour	recommended	by	the	other.	This	
antagonism	concerns	the	fact	that,	in	principle,	behaviours	which	follow	one	kind	of	norm	are	incompatible	
with	 the	 other;	 in	 practice,	 however,	 they	 can	 exhibit	 an	 ambiguous	 relationship	 –	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	
corruption,	 where	 informal	 groups	 and	 organizations	 parasitically	 prosper	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 formal	
institutions.	 However,	 in	 this	 section	 I	 shall	 concentrate	 on	 the	 less	 radical	 form	 of	 conflict	 (mutual	
exclusiveness)	which	entails	that	the	presence	of	one	type	of	norm	crowds	out	the	other	type,	without	this	
event	involving	prohibition.	
Titmuss,	 in	 his	 The	 Gift	 Relationship	 (1970),	 put	 forward	 the	 idea	 that	 payment	 for	 blood	 donations	
reduces	 or	 eliminates	 the	 willingness	 to	 donate	 blood	 because	 it	 represses	 social	 and	 ethical	 norms	
associated	with	 the	 act	 of	 donation.	Donation	of	 blood	 as	 a	 gift	 and	 as	 a	marketable	 good	 are	mutually	
exclusive,	 and	 refer	 to	 two	 different	 kinds	 of	 norms,	 namely,	 to	 use	 Ariely’s	 expressions	 (2008,	 p.	 68),	
“social	norms”	and	“market	norms”.		
The	consequences	of	tangible	compensations	have	been	debated	by	psychologists.	Deci	and	colleagues	
(1971;	 1999)	 have	 argued	 that	monetary	 rewards	 undermine	 intrinsic	motivations	 –	 that	 is,	motivations	
which	are	independent	of	external	rewards	and	may	depend	on	the	internalisation	of	social	norms.	These	
arguments	have	been	examined	by	non-standard	economic	theory,	which	points	out	that,	while	standard	
economic	 theory	 predicts	 that	 raising	 monetary	 compensation	 will	 improve	 performance,	 experimental	
findings	show	that	raising	monetary	compensation	worsens	 it.	Frey	and	colleagues	 (Frey	and	Oberholzer-
Gee	1997)	argued	 that	monetary	 rewards	can	destroy	 intrinsic	motivations,	as	proved	by	a	 survey	which	
showed	that	monetary	incentives	limited	the	acceptance	of	a	nuclear	waste	repository	by	residents	in	two	
communities	in	Switzerland,	because	the	sense	of	civic	duty	had	been	crowded	out	(Frey	and	Oberholzer-
Gee,	1997.	See	also	Gneezy	and	Rustichini,	2000b).	
Intrinsic	motivations	and	extrinsic	monetary	motivations	produce	different	behaviours	because	they	are	
characterised	by	conformity	with	different	systems	of	rules.	This	 is	the	contention	of	Ariely	 (2008,	p.	68),	
who	argues	that	“we	live	simultaneously	in	two	different	worlds	–	one	where	social	norms	prevail,	and	the	
other	 where	market	 norms	make	 the	 rules”.	 Heyman	 and	 Ariely	 (2004)	 have	 noted	 that	 people	 usually	
apply	 these	 kinds	 of	 norms	 separately	 because	 they	 are	 mutually	 exclusive.	 It	 is	 easy	 to	 imagine	 the	
consequences	of	behaviour	which	treats	private	situations	in	monetary	terms	(such	as	paying	your	mother-
in-law	for	having	participated	 in	her	Thanksgiving	dinner):	 the	 introduction	of	“market	norms”	 into	social	
rules	by	means	of	monetary	payments	may	generate	conflict	and	damage	social	 relationships.21	 In	 short,	
when	people	operate	in	a	“monetary-marketplace”,	they	refer	to	a	sort	of	formal	contract	through	which	
they	expect	corresponding	compensation.	By	contrast,	when	they	refer	to	a	social	norm,	monetary	rewards	
may	be	perceived	as	disincentives.		
In	my	 terms,	 this	 view	 describes	mutual	 exclusiveness	 between	 the	 formal	 norms	 of	 the	market	 and	
social	norms.	When	a	formal	norm	of	the	market	invades	the	space	of	a	social	norm	and	exchange	assumes	
a	monetary	form,	this	produces	negative	effects	because	the	social	norm	is	crowded	out.	The	two	kinds	of	
norm	are	incompatible,	although	this	does	not	imply	‘prohibition’.22	
There	 are	 other	 circumstances	 in	 which	 informal	 social	 norms	 and	 formal	 rules	 associated	 with	 the	
functioning	of	the	market	are	mutually	exclusive.	Jon	Elster	(1989,	p.	110)	describes	a	type	of	behaviour	for	
which	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 define	 the	 underlying	 social	 norm,	 starting	 from	 an	 example	 suggested	 by	 Amos	
Tversky:	
	
“Consider	 a	 suburban	 community	 where	 all	 houses	 have	 small	 lawns	 of	 the	 same	 size.	 Suppose	 a	 houseowner	 is	
																																								 																				
21 The reverse situation, too, in which formal exchange relations are conducted through informal codes of friendship, or 
as family relationships, would probably be problematic. 
22 This situation is similar to the one explained at the end of subsection 3.3. Here, in particular, both erosion 
(complementarity of type C1) and the crowding out (conflict as mutual exclusiveness) of a social norm by a formal 
norm, discussed in this subsection and in subsection 4.1 respectively, produce negative effects. Despite this similar 
outcome, erosion is possible if there is strict homogeneity between the formal and the social norm, while crowding out 
implies that a formal norm cannot replace a social norm, because the condition of strict homogeneity is not met. 
Therefore, the social norm is simply removed, not eroded. 
willing	 to	 pay	 his	 neighbor's	 son	 ten	 dollars	 to	mow	 his	 lawn,	 but	 not	more.	 He	would	 rather	 spend	 half	 an	 hour	
mowing	the	 lawn	himself	than	pay	eleven	dollars	to	have	someone	else	do	 it.	 Imagine	now	that	the	same	person	is	
offered	twenty	dollars	to	mow	the	lawn	of	another	neighbor.	It	is	easy	to	imagine	that	he	would	refuse,	probably	with	
some	 indignation.	But	why	 is	mowing	one	 lawn	worth	$10	or	 less,	while	mowing	an	 identical	 lawn	 is	worth	$20	or	
more?”	
	
The	social	and	formal	market	rules	with	which	the	homeowner	can	alternatively	conform	his	behaviour	
are	in	conflict	since	enforcement	of	the	former	impedes	enforcement	of	the	latter.	Of	course,	a	very	high	
monetary	 reward	 might	 induce	 the	 houseowner	 to	 change	 his	 mind,	 but	 this	 possibility	 is	 usually	
unrealistic.	He	can	establish	a	market	relation	as	an	employer	of	the	neighbour's	son,	but	he	cannot	play	
the	 role	 of	 a	 worker	 who	 occasionally	mows	 the	 lawn	 of	 a	 neighbour	 for	money	 because	 this	 function	
contrasts	with	other	social	 identities	and	norms	that	connote	his	conduct.	The	economic	and	social	 roles	
that	he	performs	are	mutually	exclusive	and	operate	in	distinct	domains.	According	to	Elster	(1989,	p.	110),	
part	 of	 the	 explanation	 for	 the	 homeowner’s	 indignation	 at	 the	 proposal	 that	 he	 enter	 into	 a	 market	
relation	is	the	fact	that	he	“doesn’t	think	of	himself	as	the	kind	of	person	who	mows	other	people’s	lawns	
for	money”,	simply	“it	isn’t	done”,	and	this	is	a	“revealing	phrase	that	often	accompanies	social	norms”.	
Another	example	of	conflict	between	market	and	social	norms	is	the	Ultimatum	Game,	which	describes	
how	 pro-social	 and	 market	 behaviours	 are	 antagonistic.	 In	 this	 game,	 two	 players	 (a	 Proposer	 and	 a	
Responder)	can	 divide	a	 certain	amount	of	money	provided	by	 the	experimenter.	 The	Proposer	makes	a	
proposal	on	how	to	divide	this	sum,	which	the	Responder	can	accept	or	reject.	If	the	offer	is	accepted,	the	
money	 is	divided	as	proposed;	 if	 it	 is	rejected,	neither	player	receives	anything.	Usually,	modal	offers	are	
around	 50%	 of	 the	 total	 amount	 and	 low	 offers	 have	 about	 a	 50%	 chance	 of	 being	 rejected.	 One	
interpretation	is	that	behaviour	guided	by	the	social	norm	of	reciprocity,	which	induces	a	generous	division	
of	 money,	 and	 behaviour	 guided	 by	 the	 utilitarian	 norms	 of	 the	 market	 are	 mutually	 exclusive.	 If	 the	
amount	 received	by	 the	Proposer	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 gift	 and	not	 as	 a	means	 for	 a	market	 transaction,	 as	
Cristina	Bicchieri	suggests	(2006,	pp.	113-114),	the	behaviour	based	on	the	social	norm	excludes	utilitarian	
conduct.		
Behaviours	in	customer	and	labour	markets	are	often	judged	on	the	basis	of	norms	of	fairness,	and	not	
those	 of	 the	market.	 In	 a	 survey	 conducted	 on	 randomly	 selected	 residents	 of	 Toronto	 and	 Vancouver,	
Kahneman,	 Knetsch,	 and	 Thaler	 (1986)	 discovered	 that	 82%	 of	 the	 respondents	 regarded	 as	 unfair	 the	
hypothetical	behaviour	of	a	hardware	store	which	raised	the	price	of	snow	shovels	after	a	blizzard.	A	price	
increase	would	have	been	considered	acceptable	if	it	had	reflected	a	real	cost	increase,	but	not	as	a	mere	
response	 to	 scarcity.	 The	 conduct	 reflecting	 a	 social	 norm	of	 fairness	 is	 incompatible	with	 the	utilitarian	
behaviour	of	the	market,	because	taking	advantage	of	the	increase	in	demand	associated	with	a	particular	
contingency	is	simply	perceived	as	unfair.	Therefore,	behaviours	which	adhere	to	the	formal	norms	of	the	
market	and	to	the	social	norms	of	fairness	respectively	are	perceived	as	mutually	exclusive.		
The	 question	 is	 this:	 what	 links	 the	 different	 approaches	 adopted	 by	 scholars	 of	 social	 problems	
(Titmuss),	psychologists	(Deci	and	colleagues),	philosophers	of	the	social	sciences	(Elster),	economists	(Frey	
and	 colleagues),	 experimental	 economists,	 economic	 psychologists	 (Ariely)	 and	 behavioural	 economists	
(Kahneman	and	 colleagues)?	 In	my	 view,	 they	 intersect	 because	 they	provide	material	 of	 different	 kinds	
that	may	be	reorganized	within	a	new	perspective	that	points	 to	a	peculiar	 form	of	conflict	between	the	
market-formal	and	social	norms	encapsulated	by	the	expression	“mutual	exclusiveness”.	However,	they	do	
not	advance	a	 theory	on	 the	 relationships	between	 formal	 and	 informal	norms;	even	 less	do	 they	 share	
methods,	aims	and	perspectives.	
	
	
5.	 Conclusion	
	
In	 recent	 decades,	 many	 disciplines	 have	 studied	 formal	 and	 informal	 norms,	 and	many	 approaches	
within	each	discipline	have	developed	different	theories.	The	result	is	a	fragmentation	due	to	two	factors:	
1)	different	tools	are	used	in	these	analyses;	2)	these	analyses	either	consider	local	aspects	or	explore	only	
partial	 dimensions	 of	 the	 problem	without	 putting	 forward	 an	 overarching	 theory.	Whence	 derives	 the	
attempt	made	 in	 this	paper	 to	develop	a	unitary	 framework	 in	which	 to	examine	 these	matters.	 For	 this	
purpose,	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 has	 been	 proposed	 that	 would	 include	 some	 of	 the	 analytical	 results	
highlighted	by	those	approaches.	This	operation	is	not	without	its	theoretical	consequences	because,	when	
analytical	 results	 produced	 in	 various	 contexts	 are	 included	 in	 a	 new	 framework,	 they	 acquire	meanings	
that	 they	do	not	 exhibit	 in	 their	 original	 contexts,	 for	 the	 simple	 reason	 that	 they	are	 reinterpreted	and	
reorganized	in	the	light	of	the	new	frame	of	reference.	
More	 in	 detail,	 the	 interpretation	 put	 forward	 in	 this	 paper	 consists	 in	 the	 identification	 of	 two	
principles	 (in	 their	 turn	divided	 into	 two	 sub-categories)	able	 to	 represent	 the	 fundamental	 relationships	
between	formal	and	social	norms,	i.e.	complementarity	and	conflict.	The	adoption	of	complementarity	and	
conflict	 as	 criteria	 to	 evaluate	 how	 formal	 and	 social	 norms	 relate	 to	 each	 other	 has	 necessitated	 a	
discussion	 about	 the	 theoretical	 legitimacy	 of	 this	 choice.	 This	 discussion	 is	 methodological	 in	 that	 the	
paper	tries	to	explain	why	these	criteria	and	not	others	are	suitable	for	the	analysis	of	the	topic	dealt	with	
here.	 The	 outcome	 is	 a	 representation	 of	 the	 relations	 between	 social	 and	 formal	 norms	which	 can	 be	
summarised	as	follows.	Formal	and	social	norms	constitute	different	systems	of	social	coordination.	If	they	
cooperate,	they	are	in	a	relationship	of	complementarity.	This	latter	can	assume	two	forms	(i.e.,	C1	and	C2	
complementarity).	When	the	two	types	of	norm	cover	contiguous	areas,	and	a	function	performed	by	one	
of	them	can	be	performed	by	the	other,	this	condition	(which	I	call	‘strict	homogeneity’)	allows	in	principle	
for	one	norm	to	erode	and	to	replace	the	other.	This	is	type	C1	complementarity,	illustrated	by	considering	
how	 legal	 and	 market	 norms	 replace	 specific	 functions	 previously	 exercised	 by	 social	 norms.	 However,	
other	 functions	 performed	 by	 social	 norms,	 which	 implement	 cooperation	 with	 formal-legal	 norms,	 are	
neither	 erodible	 nor	 replaceable.	 This	 situation	 comprises	 type	 C2	 complementarity.	 It	 involves	 not	 only	
aspects	of	social	norms	which	cannot	be	eroded	but	also	social	conventions	which	cannot	be	replaced	by	
formal	prescriptions.		
Social	and	formal	norms	can	be	antagonistic.	In	particular,	the	relationships	of	conflict	can	assume	two	
forms:	 ‘prohibition’	 and	 ‘mutual	 exclusiveness’.	 ‘Prohibition’	 means	 that	 one	 kind	 of	 norm	 tends	 to	
suppress	or	alter	 the	other.	 Legal	norms	 tend	 to	suppress	or	alter	 social	norms	which	are	at	 the	basis	of	
behaviours	that	engender	racial,	gender	or	religious	discrimination,	or	practices	such	as	duelling,	or	illegal	
markets.	‘Mutual	exclusiveness’	implies	that	one	type	of	norm	crowds	out	the	other.	In	this	case,	the	two	
kinds	of	norm	are	alternatives,	and	adoption	of	one	prevents	(but	does	not	prohibit)	adoption	of	the	other.	
Therefore,	 individuals	 choose	 the	 norm	 that	 they	 consider	 more	 appropriate.	 In	 short,	 two	 forms	 of	
complementarity	and	two	forms	of	conflict	characterise	the	connections	between	the	two	kinds	of	norms,	
both	in	many	dimensions	of	social	life	and	–	more	specifically	–	in	the	economic	sphere,	where	the	formal	
dimension	of	the	market	interacts	with	informal	behaviours.	
This	 conceptual	 framework	 differs	 from	 those	 in	 the	 current	 literature	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons.	 The	
most	 evident	 is	 that	 existing	 studies	 do	 not	 sufficiently	 discuss	 the	 concepts	 of	 complementarity	 and	
conflict.	 Although	 these	 notions	 are	 logically	 or	 descriptively	 involved	 in	 these	 approaches,	 they	 are	
infrequently	mentioned,	 if	 at	 all.	 Hayek’s	 and	North’s	 theories	 do	 not	 use	 (at	 least	 not	 in	 a	 satisfactory	
manner)	 the	notions	of	 complementarity	 and	 conflict,	 although	 some	of	 the	problems	 that	 they	address	
can	be	 reformulated	 in	 light	of	 these	concepts.	Karl	Polanyi’s	perspective	 is	 compatible	with	concepts	of	
complementarity	 and	 conflict,	 although	 he	 does	 not	 employ	 these	 terms.	 However,	 he	 adopts	 a	
substantivist-institutional	perspective	(see	Adaman	and	Madra	2002,	pp.	1045-1051)	which	is	better	able	to	
delineate	 the	 relationships	 between	 the	 market	 and	 social	 domains	 than	 views	 which	 refer	 to	
methodological	individualism.	Existing	typologies	mainly	concern	institutional	systems,	also	in	comparative	
terms.	Unlike	in	this	paper,	they	focus	on	relations	between	formal	and	informal	 institutions,	rather	than	
formal	and	 informal	norms	as	components	of	 institutions.	Although	they	shed	 light	on	many	 institutional	
phenomena,	they	do	not	adequately	examine	the	criteria	on	which	they	are	constructed,	which	leads	to	a	
formulation	 of	 taxonomies	 in	 which	 the	 description	 of	 empirical	 cases	 prevails	 over	 the	 theoretical	
examination	of	concepts	adopted	to	explain	 them.	One	consequence	of	 this	 shortcoming	 is	 that	some	of	
these	criteria	could	be	reformulated	and	simplified	by	considering	the	various	features	of	complementarity	
and	 conflict,	 ultimately	 by	 using	 the	 classification	 proposed	 here.	 More	 generally,	 as	 regards	 the	
interpretation	of	 the	 relationships	between	 formal	and	 informal	norms	 in	 terms	of	 complementarity	and	
conflict,	 I	 suggest	 that	C1	complementarity	would	make	 it	possible	to	reformulate	the	 idea,	developed	 in	
both	evolutionary	and	historical	approaches	(see	section	2),	that	formal	norms	arise	from	informal	norms	
(sub-section	 3.1).	 My	 approach	 also	 shows	 how	 C2	 complementarity	 can	 reframe	 the	 concepts	 of	
‘expressive	dimension’	and	‘social	meaning’	in	social	norms,	and	how	it	helps	in	interpreting	the	place	and	
role	of	particular	social	norms	and	conventions	(sub-section	3.2).	As	regards	the	economic	sphere,	the	use	
of	 C1	 complementarity	 suggests	 a	 perspective	 by	 means	 of	 which	 a	 variety	 of	 phenomena	 could	 be	
investigated,	from	labour	contracts	to	the	introduction	of	particular	fines	in	situations	jointly	regulated	by	
social	norms	and	the	formal	norms	of	the	market	(sub-section	4.1).	The	notion	of	mutual	exclusiveness	may	
help	in	evaluating	how	in	the	economic	sphere	the	formal	market	norms	crowd	out	social	norms	in	many	
circumstances	(sub-section	4.2).	Complementarity	and	conflict	also	reorganize	some	of	the	ideas	–	such	as	
that	of	“intrinsic	motivation”	or	that	involved	in	the	Ultimatum	Game	–	put	forward	in	studies	on	economic	
psychology,	and	on	behavioural	and	experimental	economics	(sub-section	4.2).	
Finally,	 if	 the	 notions	 of	 complementarity	 and	 conflict	 are	 criteria	 useful	 for	 conceptualising	 the	
relationships	between	formal	and	informal	norms,	they	should	not	simply	be	interpreted	as	boxes	in	which	
an	indefinite	number	of	empirical	cases	might	be	included	in	the	manner	of	a	Linnaean	entomologist	when	
confronted	with	an	unknown	insect.	By	contrast,	this	paper	suggests	the	use	of	these	criteria	to	explore	the	
nature	 of	 formal	 and	 informal	 norms,	 to	 study	 their	 features,	 to	 discover	 the	 logic	 governing	 their	
relationships,	and	only	then	to	propose	a	possible	classification.	
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